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News media and political contestation in the Somali territories: defining the 
parameters of a transnational digital public  
This article examines the extent to which different forms and technologies of media 
production facilitate popular participation in a „digital public‟ across the politically 
fragmented Somali territories. Based on textual analysis of local media and 
comparative examination of news production and consumption, the article emphasises 
the dual character of the public sphere in the Somali context. Here, local media 
production centred in individual capitals of various political administrations  coexists 
and overlaps with a transnational arena of Somali-language broadcasting and debate 
from various externally-based media networks. In this distinctive Somali media 
ecology, multiple forms of „old‟ media intersect with digital technologies that have 
emerged throughout the post-1991 period of statelessness, conflict and political 
reconfiguration. Local public spheres of media production and public engagement help 
create state-like identities and political imaginaries. Nonetheless, these are articulated 
in the wider transnational Somali-language digital public that such administrations have 
limited ability to control. In this context certain notions of a transnational „Somali‟ 
ethnolinguistic or religio-cultural community are maintained not in spite of conflict and 
fragmentation, but rather as a result of a media ecology and digital public that itself 
exists as an outcome of political instability and flux.   
Keywords: Digital media; Somalia; social media; conflict; public sphere 
Introduction 
Sitting in a café in Hargeysa in the late afternoon, customers are chatting, checking their 
smartphones, drinking tea, and watching the television mounted in the corner. „Officially‟ 
Hargeysa is a large city in northwest Somalia, but to most people here it is the capital of the 
Republic of Somaliland – independent, but internationally unrecognized, since 1991. The set 
is tuned to Universal TV, a private Somali-language news channel whose headquarters is in 
London. The news readers, reporters, and scrolling ticker describe events across the region 
and beyond. A road has been opened, a politician has been welcomed at an airport, a bomb 
has gone off.  These events are presented as happening everywhere from Wajir to Wajaale, 
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Jowhar to Jigjiga, Bosaaso to Bristol, Mogadishu to Minneapolis. These places are spread 
across five different nation states - or six if you include the Republic of Somaliland - with 
some located in the various de facto autonomous regional administrations that make up 
„Somalia‟ itself. They are linked - implicitly in their seamless presentation by the journalists 
– by the fact that they are all home to people who consider themselves to be Somalis and 
speak the Somali language. The reporter doesn‟t (and doesn‟t need to) tell the audience that 
Wajir is in Kenya or that Jowhar is in Somalia, though he might later mention the respective 
governments of those states as actors in the story. People in each of those places are potential 
consumers of this content, and may call into the channel or engage with it through social 
media.  Somebody changes the channel to Somaliland National Television. Alongside the 
links to its Facebook or Youtube channels,  a different range of iconography is displayed and 
a different political-geographical lexicon is used by its presenters. SLNTV is the state 
broadcaster of an unrecognised state: it covers events in the capital of the Republic of 
Somaliland, in its political institutions, or in the villages of the districts of its regions.  
 Universal TV and SLNTV are just two channels that form part of the expansive 
transnational network of Somali-language digital media. This is made up of multiple state and 
private satellite television channels, dozens of radio stations and almost countless online 
news sites. Possible shared engagement in all of this is facilitated by multimedia internet 
broadcasting and cross-cutting social media platforms. Conceptualising this „digital public‟ 
across the Somali Horn of Africa requires an appreciation of distinct dynamics of political 
contestation and media production, which are themselves the result of prolonged instability 
and processes of state-reconstruction. Across the political administrations that (still) make-up 
the juridical idea of „Somalia‟ there exists a dual public sphere of news media production, 
consumption and popular engagement. Here, local media production centred in individual 
capitals of various political administrations (such as The Federal Government of Somalia, the 
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autonomous Puntland State of Somalia, or the de facto independent Republic of Somaliland) 
coexists and overlaps with a transnational arena of Somali-language broadcasting and debate. 
This is dominated by various externally-based Somali-language media networks active on the 
ground in the Somali Horn of Africa. The former aspect of this „dual‟ public sphere can be 
conceived of as local media covering politics in and around the aforementioned centres of 
various state-like administrations or secessionist territories. The latter encompasses a variety 
of transnational Somali-language media producers who broadcast across these political 
boundaries. Their content is consumed and engaged with in an online digital public by 
audiences and political actors in each location.  
„Transnational‟ here does not simply mean „diasporic‟ as both levels of this public 
sphere involve internationally-mobile and locally-based participants. Furthermore, this 
duality is conceptualised in political rather than technological terms. Media producers at both 
the local and transnational levels of Somali political generate and reproduce content using 
different means. A vast array of audio-visual and print media production (found in radio and 
television broadcasts, news articles and editorials) is regularly digitalised into an online 
Somali-language media environment accessible in the Somali territories and in the diaspora. 
Social media platforms such as Youtube and Facebook intersect and overlap with this content 
and these networks, further blurring distinctions between „new‟ and „traditional‟ media. At 
the same time, the high levels of mobility of elite producers within media networks 
complicate distinctions between „diasporic‟ and „local‟ media. Although local media 
networks create specific discourse and important „imagined communities‟1 around particular 
Somali political projects, the focus of this article is on a macro-level transnational digital 
public. This intersects with the local, but also provides avenues for popular political 
engagement for media consumers digitally exposed to an international Somali-language 
digital public.  
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Political fragmentation and media production/consumption are contextualised below 
across three research sites: capital cities of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), 
Puntland, and Somaliland – Mogadishu (Muqdisho), Garoowe, and Hargeysa. The article 
proceeds to demonstrate how multiple forms of traditional and new, local and diasporic 
media coalesce into a transnational Somali-language digital public. The operational dynamics 
of this digital public are then outlined with examples demonstrating popular engagement with 
political issues through overlapping news and social media. Data from two specific (but, I 
argue, characteristic) examples of Facebook engagement with a major external Somali-
language broadcaster is presented to illustrate some of the ways in which Somalis from across 
and beyond the territories express themselves in this multi-media digital public. The article 
argues that distinctive technological and political developments of Somali media have created 
a transnational space in which different political projects are debated, reaffirmed and 
contested with reference to notions of the wider (and culturally, religiously and ethno-
linguistically defined) „Somali‟ Horn of Africa.  
Observations presented here are informed by the author‟s research and professional 
experiences of media consumption in different parts of the Somali Horn of Africa since 
2009
2
. Six-months of fieldwork was undertaken in 2015 comprising of content analysis of a 
sample of news and social media texts from (or associated with) the three cities; 40 semi-
structured interviews with media-producers and government officials; questionnaire data 
collection from 325 university students in these three locations; and nine focus groups 
discussions with male and female undergraduates
3
.  Logistical and security constraints 
limited the scope of my doctoral research on media consumption to the social category of 
„students‟ and no claims are made about the representativeness of this sample for the totality 
of urban and rural Somali society. Nonetheless, this data is contextualised with wider analysis 
of texts in the networked media environment. Furthermore, students in the booming Somali 
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tertiary education sector are an important part of a generation of young people who have 
grown up in a politically fragmented Somalia and have had no direct experience of the 
unitary post-colonial state. Young people also represent a high proportion of media producers 
and consumers within the wider Somali digital public and are thus an important group in the 
context of the rapidly changing information environment.  
Public sphere theory and the Somali case 
Modern theorisation of Habermas‟ venerable concept of the „public sphere‟ continues to 
grapple with the rise of the internet: decentred „networks of networks‟ providing citizens with 
multiple digital fora in which to debate, shape new identities, and mobilise in „counter-
publics‟ 4 . Western-focused scholarship is currently scrambling to account for the 
complexities of the modern information environment that challenge core concepts of gate-
keeping and framing in media studies and dominate popular discussions of „post-truth‟ 
political communication
5
. In African media studies the usefulness of the basic Habermasian 
public sphere framework has long been questioned in light of  global technological change 
and experiences of postcolonial state-building. Much of this literature focuses on the 
potentials of citizens‟ technological engagement with the state in promoting or strengthening 
democratisation, or inculcating (or providing avenues for resistance against) liberal 
subjectivities
6
. This scholarship often transcends teleological conceptualisations of 
journalists‟ contributions to the democratisation and „good governance‟ agendas of global 
liberalism. Hasty, for instance, usefully emphasises the contradictions inherent in journalists‟ 
understanding of their roles as „objective watchdogs of liberal discourse…who are 
necessarily and routinely implicated in a political culture of power and privilege that 
straddles both public and private spheres‟7.  
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Nonetheless, much of this literature has necessarily focused on contexts where 
juridically recognised states have a degree of control over their territories and the electoral 
processes that take place nationally. Post-colonial African states are often characterised in 
terms of ethno-linguistic diversity, urban/rural cleavages and the efforts of authoritarian, 
post-authoritarian, or hybrid regimes to control the potential for resistance generated in 
emerging digital publics, or harness such technology for their own ends
8
. Across the Somali 
territories, however, the combination of prolonged state collapse, conditions of statelessness, 
and the development of multiple new and competing administrative entities is the most 
obvious difference observable in comparison to a continental standard of unitary (if weak or 
contested) statehood.  
Furthermore, the Somali  digital public  Somalia is built largely around the fact of 
relative ethno-linguistic homogeneity. „Standard‟ Somali (the Af Maxaa Tiri dialect) as 
formalised by Siyaad Barre‟s military regime in 1972 serves as a lingua franca for public 
sphere communication and the vast majority of media are broadcast in this dialect. It provides 
the linguistic basis by which transnational Somali-language broadcasting and popular 
engagement with media operates across the different political administrations of the region. 
This is not to suggest that differences in dialect (or „minority‟ ethno-linguistic groups) are 
unimportant. Whether defined in terms of „Somali‟ lineage-group grievances, ethno-linguistic 
or racial distinctions (the position of Af Maay dialect speakers, or the diverse groups of 
people referred to as the „Bantu‟ or Jareer populations), the marginalisation of various groups 
is a feature of unresolved legacies of the post-colonial unitary state experience, state collapse, 
civil war and ongoing political reconfiguration
9
. The construction of ideas of a certain degree 
of „Somali‟ cultural, religious and linguistic homogeneity is a complicated legacy of the post-
colonial state-building experience. It is also both a result of - and a prerequisite for - the 
modern, transnational Somali-language digital public.  
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Debate within the public sphere has long been theorised to play a crucial role in 
defining community parameters and norms. Calhoun has argued that Habermas‟ notion of 
actors entering into a public sphere with pre-defined (if bracketed) identities, equipped to 
engage in rational-critical dialogue, appeared either as a Euro-centric abstraction or as an 
unrealistic assessment of the actual dynamics of the classical „coffee-house‟ model itself10. 
This critique recognised the unanticipated resilience of modern forms of nationalism in the 
post-Cold War era, flourishing alongside (and not in spite of) globalisation. There have been 
different ways to respond to this apparent theoretical blind-spot on the role of „rational‟ 
argumentation, one of which is highlighted in Wedeen‟s conceptualisation of „mini-publics‟ 
in Yemen. These, she argues, facilitate the emergence of what she describes as non-liberal 
democratic subjectivities through deliberative spaces
11
. Another response seen in the 
Africanist literature involves jettisoning the public-sphere label altogether, replacing it with 
the concept of „popular culture‟, which, for Barber, is characterised by the arts as a channel 
for public communications, outside of the formal media limelight dominated by elites
12
. 
Willems notes that „an advantage of conceptualising sites of popular culture as publics is that 
it avoids Habermas‟ elitist connotation of his concept of the public sphere – popular culture 
often engages, interacts and responds to official debates‟13.  
A problem with using this conceptualisation of popular culture as a site of 
contestation for the Somali case is that it relies on a fairly clear division between „official‟ 
(state) and „unofficial‟ (popular) debates. This distinction - in the context of modern Somali 
media and prolonged political fragmentation or effective statelessness - is often blurred and 
ambiguous. Furthermore, the emergence of competing Somali „state‟ actors (often out of 
conditions of statelessness) complicates discussions of counter-publics in that there is no 
single coherent state against which a religious, ideological or cultural counter-public can 
clearly define itself. Fragmented counter-publics aligned against local political projects or 
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broader processes of national state reconfiguration do exist, with one obvious example being 
the sophisticated digital public activity of Harakaat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidiin (Al Shabaab), 
which wages war on „apostate‟ foreign-backed administrations across Somalia. Nevertheless, 
the notion of a distinct counter-public is problematic in this case for several reasons. These 
include broader histories of Islamist mobilisation and popular cultural identification that 
transcend Al Shabaab as an individual ideological actor; the lack of explicit state promotion 
of secularism; and the aforementioned public sphere of communications and debate 
encompassing multiple political projects.  
The political context of a digital public   
Mogadishu retains its symbolic status as capital of the post-colonial Somali state and remains 
the seat of the Federal Government of Somalia installed in 2012. The FGS has succeeded – 
with the help of African Union Mission for Somalia forces (AMISOM) and the „international 
community‟ – in establishing a modicum of control over all of the districts of the capital. 
Formal Al Shabaab governance of neighbourhoods in Mogadishu ended with their expulsion 
in 2011, and FGS/AMISOM/US efforts to dislodge the Islamist militants from remaining 
south-central Somali strongholds continue to the present. However, attacks by Al Shabaab 
continue in Mogadishu and the insurgency remains undefeated.  
The FGS has moved towards the reconfiguration of the Somali state along „federal‟ 
lines as outlined in 2012‟s Provisional Constitution. This often fraught process has been at 
times led from Mogadishu, and at others spurred by developments in the regions largely 
outside of the control of power-holders in the capital
14
. A delayed indirect election process 
for the legislative and executive branches of government was completed by early 2017. This 
involved clan elders in the (often nascent) federal regions selecting electoral-college 
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delegates to choose MPs, who in turn elected the new President Maxamed Cabdilaahi 
„Farmaajo‟ (a US-Somali dual citizen) in February 2017.  
Since 2012, significant economic change has been visible in Mogadishu. With the 
promise of greater security, local business sectors and the real-estate market have flourished, 
driven by returnee diaspora investors as well as infrastructure projects undertaken by foreign 
donors such as Turkey. A dib-u-dhis (reconstruction) discourse is a powerful phenomenon in 
imaginations both of and about the nation
15
. Viewed through the lenses of international 
mainstream media and a powerful social media environment in which many politically 
engaged Somalis are active, the battle-lines of this discursive contest are clear: between 
portrayals of Mogadishu and Somalia that emphasise tropes of conflict, terrorism, piracy and 
humanitarian suffering, and those that showcase the achievements of a changing nation. 
Garoowe is the political capital of the Puntland State of Somalia, a quasi-autonomous 
administration formed in 1998 with the stated intention of integrating into a federal Somali 
state when the conditions to do so are deemed appropriate. Puntland currently represents the 
most fully formed and functional example of a Somali federal (regional) state without 
secessionist aspirations. Since its establishment as a political settlement between the mainly 
Majeerteen sub-clans (of the more broadly conceived Daarood clan-family) who inhabit the 
north-east, the Puntland State of Somalia has developed many institutions of statehood. 
Handovers of political power have been facilitated peacefully albeit indirectly through the 
votes of the legislature (Golaha Wakiilada) as opposed to the popular suffrage put into 
practice in the Republic of Somaliland‟s elections. 
Despite its stated fidelity to the idea of a re-unified Somalia, Puntland has maintained 
an ambiguous and often antagonistic relationship with the FGS in Mogadishu. In jockeying 
for position in the ongoing federalisation process the Puntland administration has a clear idea 
of its interests, has shown itself willing to periodically sever relations with Mogadishu, and 
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often accuses southern actors of political intrigue around its borders. Such real-politick 
overlaps with clan-inflected narratives surrounding the unreconciled legacy of the Somali 
civil war that led to the overthrow of Siyaad Barre‟s regime in 199116. Perceptions that 
Hawiye sub-clans „took‟ Mogadishu from a military dictator associated with certain sub-clans 
of the Daarood are still voiced by political actors and remain relevant in a turbulent context 
where the future centres of gravity of a re-emerging Somali state are currently being defined.   
By contrast, Somaliland‟s unambiguous claim of secession is grounded in the juridical 
existence of the former British Protectorate that joined in union with the Italian South to form 
the Somali Republic in 1960. The revocation of this union is based on the experience of 
resistance to Siyaad Barre‟s regime and the marginalisation and extreme persecution faced by 
the predominantly Isaaq sub-clans of the north-west
17
. Political development in the territory 
has produced distinctive institutional frameworks for governance and relatively democratic 
and peaceful transitions of power. Delayed presidential and parliamentary elections were 
contested again through the state‟s tripartite system in November 2017. The incumbent 
President Axmed Maxamed Maxmuud „Silaanyo‟ did not stand for re-election and his party 
colleague, Muuse Bixi Cabdi, prevailed in a relatively free, fair, and peaceful election
18
.  
The emergence of Somaliland as an independent and increasingly sovereign actor 
remains a controversial project both within the region and in certain parts of the territory 
itself. The relative ease of access combined with the apparent dynamism of political and 
economic development have made Hargeysa a hub for researchers and a burgeoning literature 
exists emphasising Somaliland‟s distinctive post-civil war trajectory19. With this in mind, it is 
important to clarify the political-geographical focus of this article‟s analysis. Many people in 
the Republic of Somaliland would object to the discussion of their independent state in such a 
comparative analysis, in that its very inclusion might suggest that Somaliland was but another 
„region‟ of the Somalia that many people in the northwest want desperately to detach 
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themselves from. This is an identifiable discursive strategy which, conversely, prompts this 
article‟s explicitly comparative focus.  
Furthermore, media in Hargeysa discuss and comment on „Somalia‟ in particular 
ways (often emphasising instability, or omitting mention of it), and these constructions of the 
„other‟ play a significant role in the foundational discourses of Somaliland‟s history, political 
identity, development and current status. However, Somaliland is not entirely detached from 
the transnational Somali-language digital public, and here constitutes a subject for political 
debate. In Mogadishu and Garoowe media and political commentators use different modes of 
expression for their discussions of Somaliland, each other, and other locations of political 
influence. Often these codes and associated debates explicitly engage the notion of the 
Somali Ummah (Ummadda Soomaaliyeed). This religiously defined transnational ethno-
polity is of importance to many commentators in each of the locations studied and 
incorporates notions of a wider imagined ethno-community of „Greater Somalia‟, split by 
colonial borders and power politics between Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and the post-colonial 
state of Somalia
20
. The importance of this regional politics of naming is heightened by the 
diverse means through which debate across these boundaries is engaged.  
Media production 
The news media market across the contemporary Somali Horn is characterised by great 
diversity and fragmentation. Radio broadcasting (and external media influence) across the 
far-flung Somali territories predominantly inhabited by nomadic pastoralists has a historical 
lineage dating back to the British colonial era
21
. Although the younger urban generation 
might regard radio as a medium associated with their parents or grandparents, FM 
broadcasting continues to be the most accessible means of receiving information for a 
majority of the population in both urban and rural settings. The perception that radio remains 
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the primary media of the masses also explains why it is radio broadcasters who are most 
frequently affected by states‟ sporadic or persistent attempts at control or censorship. This is 
evident in law in Somaliland where private (local) FM radio broadcasting is prohibited by a 
state in fear of the proliferation of broadcasters representing highly sectional clan 
constituencies
22
. By comparison, in Mogadishu‟s more fluid private radio market there were 
around 30 FM stations broadcasting daily (as of mid 2015). 
Satellite-connected TVs are standard features in practically all moderately affluent 
homes and are ubiquitous in all manner of restaurants and cafes. Often connected via Arab-
world linked receivers, Somali-language broadcasting makes up only a small proportion of 
the total number of (the hundreds of) channels available. Networks such as Universal TV, 
Horn Cable and Somali Channel dominate this segment of the market and are often based in 
the diaspora. Rolling news coverage of events in Somalia, issues affecting the global Somali 
community and world news dominates their output. Also common are political debates as 
well as cultural programming featuring poets and musicians (often from the pre-1991 era). 
Punctuating all this, the globalised market of the Ummadda Soomaaliyeed is continuously 
invoked in constant advertisements for everything from Somali doctors in St. Paul, to 
mattresses in Mogadishu, or nappies in Nairobi.  
In the post-independence era newspapers did not have the same status or coverage of 
radio due to logistical difficulties of national distribution and low levels of literacy. During 
this period newspapers remained an elite, urban and state-controlled enterprise, epitomised by 
the nationalist mouthpiece of Barre‟s regime, Xidigta Oktoobar (The October Star). State 
collapse was followed by a profusion of newspaper publishing in the capital and the 
publications that emerged at this time often served as the mouthpieces of the various clan-
based factions vying for power. This profusion of newspaper publishing in Mogadishu was 
not sustained through the subsequent period characterised, from the late 1990s, by a stateless 
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status-quo of factional power-sharing and the development of neighbourhood Islamic courts 
structures. By the time the embryonic Islamic Courts Union had been overthrown by the US-
backed Ethiopian invasion of 2006, virtually no newspapers were being printed in the city
23
. 
In Mogadishu today, only two daily papers are published. In Hargeysa, the fall of Barre‟s 
regime also precipitated an explosion of private newspaper printing. Unlike in Mogadishu, 
the Somaliland‟s more stable environment allowed for this to be sustained24. Despite tight 
profit margins and competition from online news, more than 10 papers are now published 
daily or weekly in the city
25
.  
Print media overlaps into Somali cyberspace, a vast and predominantly unregulated 
space of information and entertainment content dissemination. The rapid expansion of mobile 
telecommunications across the territories in the post state-collapse period is a topic that has 
been emphasised by numerous commentators, often those with an enthusiastic interest in the 
anarcho-capitalist development of private, cheap, efficient and widespread mobile 
connectivity
26
. The high level of social penetration of mobile phones across society and the 
bypassing of older statist institutions of public communication has brought with it an 
widespread infrastructure of internet connectivity. Whilst internet cafes are still important 
centres for the (young) masses to get online and plug into these worlds of news-media or 
social networking, the rapid expansion of mobile internet technology has meant that online 
activity is an increasingly privatised experience. The online realm, which encompasses and 
re-broadcasts the established mediums of radio and TV, is accessible through the ubiquitous 
smartphone.  
The online news media market is made up of hundreds of localised news websites all 
competing for traffic. In the author‟s surveys conducted amongst 325 university student 
respondents in Mogadishu, Garoowe and Hargeysa, when asked which Somali-language 
news website they used most often, participants gave 64 different answers. Although there 
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are clearly certain news websites which are more popular in these different areas amongst this 
generation, the sheer number of possible news sources reflects media production by hebel 
hebel („every so and so‟). As one male student in Puntland State University explained: 
„…the number of websites has [firstly] to do with making money – adverts for 
telecom companies, construction, for business purposes. The other [reason] is about name. 
Everyone has a website. Everything is hebel.com, hebel.net. And so many are just for 
propaganda.‟27 
 
  Despite the multiplicity of competing online platforms and the presence of a large 
number that represent very specific sectional views or constituencies, a significant proportion 
of these sites are updated regularly with breaking news and the uploading of opinion pieces. 
This is indicative of the large numbers of people involved in these processes both in the 
diaspora - where many websites are hosted and where the website owner may reside - and in 
Somalia, where the site will characteristically employ a small number of journalists who may 
write exclusively for that site or act in a freelance capacity
28
. A laissez faire attitude towards 
intellectual copyright allows for content to be copied and spread across different online 
platforms. Although some sites are configured to prevent the lifting of their copy this practice 
is often tolerated as „the way things are done‟‟ to generate content and thus the hits important 
to the advertisers who provide a significant amount of the financing for such operations
29
. 
At the same time, globally ubiquitous social media platforms such as Facebook and 
YouTube intersect with this private Somali news media production. That networks directly 
share their content on these platforms, or that prominent politicians, intellectuals or activists 
use Facebook as a primary means of circulating opinion pieces, complicates straightforward 
distinctions between „social‟ and „traditional‟ or „professional‟ media. This blurring occurs in 
a context already characterised by extreme fragmentation, privatisation and a lack of 
commercial or state media monopolies.  
In categorising the media networks operating across the different technological 
formats, social media platforms, and commercial markets, it is possible to distinguish 
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between three main types of producers. All of these networks overlap into (and thus help 
create) a Somali-language digital public, the operational dynamics of which I explore below.  
First in this typology come private local media companies whose range of broadcast is 
limited to specific urban centres and regional territories (websites that fall into this category 
are accessible anywhere but tend to have readerships interested in particular areas). Although 
this type of media may have financing or even staff in the diaspora, it is important to 
distinguish such operations from the second category in this typology: big externally-
headquartered television stations. These, crucially, have „national‟ coverage and a broad 
viewership - an archetype being the London-based Universal TV that is popular across the 
territories. Similar to the latter in terms of scope and broad appeal - but distinct in their 
management structures and relationship with „international‟ media - are the Somali services 
of the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Voice of America. These are accessed online 
and via radio, broadcast through dedicated shortwave frequencies and rebroadcast on various 
private FM station.  
A third category could be labelled „state‟ media, referring to the broadcasting of the 
FGS (Somali National Television/Radio Mogadishu), the Puntland State of Somalia 
(Puntland Television) and the Republic of Somaliland (Somaliland National Television/Radio 
Hargeysa). These stations consider themselves distinct from private media and carry 
government messaging. In some cases they also receive direct foreign assistance from donor 
governments. Puntland TV - whose Somali slogan describes it as „servant and defender of 
Puntland‟s interests‟ - has received financial and technical assistance from the Italian 
Government. This demonstrates certain foreign states‟ willingness to engage with (what are 
in theory) sub-state administrations to build governance capacity
30
.  
The transnationalism of this multimedia production and consumption, as well as 
engagement in a digital public, must be viewed in the context of physical mobility. Diaspora 
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figures are important actors in public life and recent accounts capture both the non-linear 
movements of „revolving returnees‟, as well as local-diaspora tensions around cultural norms 
and competition in local job markets
31
. The internationalised nature of urban public sphere 
settings is highlighted not only through the consumption of externally-produced media 
(Somali or non-Somali), but also in the content of „local‟ news. Newspapers frequently 
feature international news of relevance to diaspora communities or locals who may have 
family members abroad. Taken from foreign media and translated or commented on, this 
print and online content frequently explores controversies in Europe. During my fieldwork 
these ranged from commentary on British „anti-radicalisation‟ education policies, to 
discussion of inflammatory statements made in the European media about migration
32
. Where 
the focus is not Europe or North America a common theme is human-interest or religious-
related stories from the wider Islamic world, particularly the Gulf States where many Somalis 
reside and which are often presented as potential exemplars of successful Muslim economic 
development. Such internationalisation of content reflects the media links which exist 
between the Horn and its diaspora, but also contributes to locally produced ideas of a truly 
global Ummadda Soomaaliyeed, a trope that discursively structures many popular 
engagements in a broader Somali digital public
33
.  
Media ‘freedom’ across a digital public 
The dynamism of Somali-language media production should not obscure serious constraints 
facing journalists, which limit the content and circulation of news, and influence the 
parameters of the associated digital public. The profession is often seen as dominated by 
young men and although women are active in the field – including on dedicated stations 
committed to female rights and empowerment – the majority of correspondents are male. 
Women are often visible (or audible) as presenters on local TV or radio, whereas men tend to 
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be overrepresented in „front-line‟ news collection, due to a combination of political, cultural, 
religious and security related factors
34
. Many respondents in the focus groups I held in 
universities in Hargeysa, Garoowe and Mogadishu (including some who were part-time 
journalists themselves) believed that the industry was often staffed by under-qualified young 
men with few other prospects in local job markets. Perceiving the prerequisites for entry into 
a career in journalism to be possession of a mobile phone and an internet connection, many 
young journalists were said to be ill-equipped to deal with the different situations that they 
might encounter in complex political, commercial and security environments
35
.  
The National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ) regularly documents violence 
against journalists across the territories
36
. Somaliland, of course, has its own Journalists‟ 
organisations (e.g. SOLJA), as does Puntland (MAP). Nonetheless, NUSOJ‟s publications 
attempt to maintain the notion of a „national‟ (Somali) group of media workers and their 
reportage covers all territories regardless of the organisation‟s lack of official physical 
presence in the secessionist northwest. The 2014 NUSOJ annual report also includes alleged 
violations against ethnic Somali journalists inside Ethiopia. Here the „national‟ encompasses 
an ethnic solidarity amongst a journalistic fraternity, a practical example of the trans-border 
sensibility of a popular ethno-political imagination that is a feature of the wider digital public.  
Since the establishment of the FGS there have been several high profile arrests, detentions, 
prosecutions and convictions of journalists in Mogadishu, ostensibly for reporting 
information that has „incited‟ popular discontent directed against the state.  
Legal frameworks regulating journalistic conduct remain ambiguous despite the 
ratification in January 2016 of the Somali Media Law. This includes vague provisions that 
journalists should „avoid the dissemination or publication of videos and photos that are 
against the sound conduct of the society‟37. Ambiguities give the state significant leeway to 
prosecute individuals where it sees fit. Although the security contexts of media in Garoowe 
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or Hargeysa are somewhat less conflicted than Mogadishu, the ability of certain Somali-
language media networks to broadcast across the region is of concern for each of the different 
political authorities exercising or asserting sovereignty. It is often these „external‟ Somali-
language networks that come into most frequent conflict with state administrations in 
Mogadishu, Garoowe and Hargeysa. Puntland authorities, for instance,  have on several 
occasions suspended the operations of various external radio and television broadcasters 
(such as VOA, or Somali National TV from Mogadishu) usually under the pretext that they 
have disseminated false information, particularly with regards to internal Puntland politics or 
reporting of Puntland‟s relationship with Mogadishu38. Furthermore, authorities in Garoowe, 
Hargeysa and Mogadishu have all made sporadic moves against broadcasters such as 
Universal TV for various alleged transgressions (with instances of office closures or arrests 
occurring in these capitals in 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively). Although press freedom is 
popularly cited as an element of Somaliland‟s democratic stability (itself a highly political 
narrative as the territory defines itself in contrast to the rest of „Somalia‟), considerations of 
social stability and the legitimacy of state power are also important for both populations and 
the state in defining appropriate boundaries of media expression
39
.  
A transnational digital public in action 
Media consumers in Somalia are increasingly plugged into digital media through mobiles and 
headphones, potentially sharing public space with other people but consuming different 
content. Gone are the days when a small range of authoritative news sources was relied upon 
by the majority of a „national‟ audience. Nonetheless, these old standbys (such as the BBC) 
remain important, but depend on an increasingly diversified multi-media output. As such, 
audiences often interact online with such producers, and in a digital public will challenge and 
critique perceived political or regional biases. The perceived neutrality of external Somali-
language media sources (particularly the BBC or VOA) was discussed with university focus 
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group participants in Hargeysa, Garoowe and Mogadishu. Although many students 
emphasised their respect for the technical capacity and professionalism of the staff of these 
organisations, arguments were also made about a lack of neutrality. This might be perceived 
in an over-emphasis on negative stories affecting the different territories, disproportionate 
numbers of staff from certain groups in powerful positions in these media organisations, a 
lack of representation of journalists on the ground in certain places, or perceptions of foreign 
or western influence or propaganda. Nonetheless, the fact that these critiques came from 
consumers from each of these different locations is an indication that networks like the BBC 
or VOA at least have an interest in making efforts towards editorial balance.  
 The amalgamation of media technologies facilitates popular engagement with content 
via the social media platforms utilised by major producers. Although class-based and urban-
rural divides in internet connectivity impact on the extent to which conclusions can be 
generalised, the increasing ubiquity of affordable smart-phones and ever-expanding internet 
connectivity must be considered in regards to media consumption and engagement. 
Examination of popular social media engagement with major Somali-language news 
producers reveals significant activity both within the diaspora and within the Somali 
territories. For instance, a 2015 BBC Somali Service story uploaded to their Facebook page 
on the conviction of Shabelle Media journalists in Mogadishu generated 452 comments 
within three hours of its posting
40
. People who comment on these BBC Facebook posts 
frequently give their location, and of the 215 individuals that did, the majority (55%) stated 
that they were in Somalia/Somaliland. Despite this being a story most closely relating to 
Mogadishu, the majority (56%) of those „local‟ commentators stated that they were in cities 
and towns in Somaliland and Puntland. Although this analysis is limited to one particular 
story it corresponds with observations of media consumption, and interviews and focus 
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groups with producers/consumers, which indicate an audience for transnational Somali 
language media that is spread across the Somali territories and beyond.  
Judging by names and Facebook profiles, only around 10% of the participants in the 
above discussion were female. Although analysis of comments on different BBC Facebook 
stories within the same timeframe have shown higher female participation (e.g. around 20% 
for a story on female genital cutting with a more clearly gendered theme
41
), a more detailed 
comment on gendered participation in this digital public is beyond the scope of this article. In 
this latter BBC Somali Service story, popular engagement focused on the choice of image 
used as an illustration - a graphic image of a young girl about to undergo the procedure. 
Debate ensued amongst a digital public in the Somali territories and in the diaspora around 
both around norms of media broadcasting and the substantive issue of the practice itself 
defined, often very explicitly, in „Somali‟ religio-cultural terms.  
Levels and geographical scope of engagement aside, to what extent does such 
interaction in a digital public equate to meaningful political agency? Answers to this vary 
across the diverse Somali political and security contexts. Only in Somaliland, for instance, do 
formal mechanisms for universal suffrage currently operate, and separate analysis is needed 
to chart the rapidly changing ways in which digital media access is impacting elections 
there
42
. This article, however, has focused on the transnational digital public and in this 
regard it is important to emphasise the sensitivity and activism of commentators across the 
territories towards external perceptions of Somalia‟s apparent instability.  
Digital publics are therefore actively engaged in the construction of various counter-
narratives emphasising different political or economic developments, critiquing alleged 
misrepresentations and providing examples of political or cultural extraversion. Several 
social media campaigns have criticised foreign media portrayals of Mogadishu, for instance 
the #Someonetellmaryharper hashtag, which took aim at the use by the BBC of a particular 
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image of the aftermath of an Al Shabaab attack to illustrate a story about Mogadishu‟s first 
International Book Fair. A questionable editorial choice of image undermined the eponymous 
foreign journalist‟s attempt to highlight a positive development in the city, and the furore 
generated a substantive BBC response
43
. This campaign echoed the #someonetellCNN 
controversy in Kenya (in reaction to that network‟s depiction of the country as a „hotbed of 
terror‟) and also corresponded with the emergence of #Cadaanstudies  academic activism 
around the „whiteness‟ of Somali-focused scholarship44. Numerous other media and social 
media engagements attempt to challenge external perceptions of Somali instability. These 
have ranged from social media responses to Al Shabaab attacks on Liido Beach 
(#Tweetlidopictures) and Ugaaso Abokor‟s instagrammed promotion of daily life economic 
change in Mogadishu, to Somalilanders‟ narratives around the democratic development of 
Africa‟s „Best Kept Secret‟45.  Disaggregation of diasporic and local agency is again difficult, 
but what is of interest for analysis here is the way in which such campaigns play into a wider 
Somali-language public sphere that state-makers and citizens respond to and engage with.    
At the same time, ongoing conflict - combined with unreconciled legacies of civil 
war-era violence - play out across the regional political boundaries of the Somali digital 
public and create conditions conducive for the propagation of clan-based hate speech and 
conspiracy theorisation. Media commentary – amplified and appropriated through social 
media conduits – can often be seen to rely on misinformation and epitomise questionable-
journalistic practices. Once again, clear distinctions between professional journalism and 
popular commentary and debate break down in a context characterised by extreme 
privatisation and fragmentation of digital media spaces.  
 In January 2015 a story broke in the media across Somalia about the confiscation by 
Somaliland authorities of alleged military hardware discovered on board a Sudanese-
registered ship docked at Berbera port. Certain online media networks (based in Mogadishu) 
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subsequently posted pictures allegedly taken during the Somaliland authorities‟ public 
display of this equipment. Although some of the images of armoured personnel carriers 
appeared potentially genuine, one picture of tanks bearing World War Two-era Wehrmacht 
insignia looked out of place. Through some basic internet research the source of the image 
was identified by the author: a UK website advertising a private collection of replica WWII 
vehicles
46
. Although Somali online news media often uses „stock‟ images, in this instance the 
headline was stating that the pictures had been taken at the scene in Berbera. With the ease of 
replication of online media content these images began appearing on numerous other sites 
and social media. This, in turn, prompted some commentators to remark on the „Nazi‟ origins 
of the weaponry Somaliland was importing - as opposed to questioning the authenticity of the 
originally disseminated images themselves
47
.  
The UN arms embargo on Somalia renders such allegations a serious business, and 
the rhetoric coming from the Puntland government  illustrated the stakes potentially involved. 
Puntland frequently alleges that Somaliland plays a covert role in supporting Al Shabaab‟s 
operations, and statements by the Puntland Security Minister (as reported in the Mogadishu 
media) expressed fears that that this materiel would end up in their possession
48
. This 
prompted a response from Somaliland‟s defence minister lambasting the Puntland claims and, 
after discussions with the Sudanese Government, the ship was eventually released with the 
alleged military cargo reloaded.  
There is, of course, often a sizeable distinction to be made between the rhetoric of 
such political actors and the actual incidence of conflict on the ground. Although Somaliland 
and Puntland do engage in sporadic skirmishes, this particular incident (shouted out from the 
distance of the various political centres) did not lead to a serious escalation in tension in the 
disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag, perhaps highlighting the primacy of local factors in this 
particular context
49
. Nonetheless, it should be recognised that the combination of 
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instantaneous and transnational online media, and discursive and physical political distance 
between power centres in Somalia creates a digital public in which masses of information (or 
misinformation) can be selectively deployed and utilised by various, often anonymous actors.  
Conclusion 
Previous scholarship has emphasised the influence of the external on the local in the Somali 
context – whether through the recreation of conflict via diaspora-based media or the material 
impact of financial flows such as remittances
50
. This article has examined a public sphere 
whereby transnationalisation of production or identity is a feature of media on the ground and 
impacts the way products are consumed, understood and utilised by actors within the Somali 
territories - whether they are „locals‟ or diaspora „returnees‟ themselves. This is not to 
underplay tensions which exist in public and political life in each of the research sites around 
the influence of such returnees. Nevertheless, definitional nuance is required to attribute 
greater agency to individuals in the Somali territories as globalised producers and consumers 
of media in urban public sphere(s) and within a digital public.   
If this transnationalisation of content and the multi-directional mobility of many elite 
producers blurs dichotomies between diasporic and local agency, does it not therefore 
contradict this article‟s definition of a dual Somali public sphere? Here a clear distinction is 
made between a public sphere operating within political centres serving as capitals of 
separate, if interlinked, political projects; and another made up of transnational Somali-
language media networks. Transnational here is not merely synonymous with diasporic: 
crucially, both levels of this model involve diasporic and local participants, often through 
channels facilitated by digital media. The fact that such networks have both the technical 
capacity and audience appeal across all of the territories in question is significant for state 
actors attempting to discursively legitimise their different political projects or identities.  
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This article has analysed parameters, activities and potentials of a transnational digital 
public mobilised around an imagined ethno-linguistic community and engaged in Somali 
political realities. More work is required to compare such fora with those that exist at a more 
local level, producing and attempting to shape individual administrations that make up (or 
attempt to detach themselves from) the political patchwork that is „Somalia‟. In this particular 
context, certain notions of a transnational Somali ethnolinguistic or religio-cultural 
community are maintained not in spite of conflict and fragmentation, but rather as a result of 
a media ecology and digital public that itself exists as an outcome of such political instability 
and flux. In this way, the Somali case demonstrates challenges for African digital publics 
scholarship to engage with highly distinct political contexts where the implications of popular 
media engagement may be similarly diverse.  
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